THE IMPACT OF A CHANGING SOCIETY UPON THE ARMED FORCES

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by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis represents an examination of certain
areas of American society which have undergone notable
change since 1940 for the purpose of determining the
nature and the extent of impact which these changes have
had upon the American Military Establishment.

The period 1940 to 1960 has been chosen not only to
limit the scope of the present inquiry, but also because
this period was one of significant sociological change
which coincided with a radical change in the American
military posture.

The latter part of the nineteenth century and early
part of this century found a vigorous, politically con-
servative, wealthy young America frantically building a
great industrial nation with only a trader's interest in
the political machinations and social ills of a much
older Europe. With a vast bountiful land and a small
young population America roared into the glorious twentieth
century on her newly-built railroads, with as little
attention to her own internal troubles as to those of the
rest of the world.

In the midst of this period of American history,

Europe burst into the flaming battlefields and damp
trenches of World War I. For endless months statesmen and
would-be statesmen in the United States debated America's
course of action. Finally the United States, with a
hurriedly conscripted Expeditionary Force, entered the
conflict to "fight Britain's war". In less than 20 months
the "victors" returned to an America quite untouched, even
emotionally, by the war, and the United States weathered
the vicissitudes of her own business cycles into the
Roaring Twenties and the era of Eternal Prosperity.

Then came the Crash of 1929 and the following Great
Depression of the '30's, which had not been shaken off in
terms of unemployment and hardship when the Second World
War began in Europe. A listless America welcomed the
effect of Europe's crisis on her own factories. It is in
this America, coming finally out of depression only to
enter war, that we are here interested.

This paper will examine the rise and growth of the
American Military Establishment since 1940 and consider a
number of sociological changes which have taken place in
America and which have had an impact upon the military.
Specifically, we shall here consider America as a military
force in World War II and the Korean conflict; the effect
of the Cold War upon traditional American thinking in
regard to the military; the civilian-soldier concept; racial
integration; and present-day military society.

CHAPTER II

GROWTH OF THE MILITARY

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the
events leading up to the fateful day of 7 December 1941.
Suffice it to say that prior to the Japanese bombing of
the U. S. Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, South Oahu, Hawaii,
the balance of feeling in the United States was on the
side of "staying out of Europe's wars." America was an
industrial nation with little military power, training or
experience. Suddenly she was at war all over the world.

Before the conflict was over in all theaters, an
America of roughly 140 million people called to active
duty more than 14 million men for enlisted service in the
Armed Forces.[1] The magnitude of this feat appears in its
proper perspective only when one considers the size of the
American Army in September, 1939, when Germany invaded
Poland. "When the war began, the total officer and
enlisted personnel of the U. S. Army, which then included
the Air Corps, was less than 200,000."[2]

The Army which the United States formed as a result

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[1] Eli Ginzberg, The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. 1: The
Lost Divisions (New York: Columbia U Press, 1959), p. 1.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

of the Selective Service System could not be expected to
function as an efficient professional Army. It was
quickly equipped and trained as this country engaged in a
global war with no experience in all of history to serve
as a guide. It was this huge military force, this giant of
young citizens turned soldier overnight, which began the
change from what the oldtime and professional Army men
like to call reverently the "Old Army" to what they
scornfully call the "New Army."

It is not necessary to review here the time honored
traditions of the old military with rank and privilege
concepts, strict separation of officers and men, unrestrained
authority of the non-commissioned officer and the officer,
in order to state that the World War II drafted Army did
not fall into the old pattern even though this nation was
faced with active fighting from our own coastal waters to
the far-flung corners of the earth. Even in such time of
crisis it is not possible to overcome the cultural
conditioning of the men who made up the Armed Forces.
"More than 20 million men were examined as to their physical,
mental, and emotional suitability for military service",[3]
but it must be remembered that these were all men brought
up in a culture little concerned with international problems,

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[3] *Ibid*., p. 1.

and in many respects, actually dogmatically pacifist.
These young men were not, and did not want to be,
professional soldiers. For the most part they felt
themselves forced into a situation not of their own making,
and the majority adjusted adequately to this situation
largely out of fear and necessity; however, it could not
be expected that this mass of uniformed civilians could or
would adopt, or even accept, the standards of the small,
professional "Old Army."

The World War II fighting civilian had grown up in
an America which, a generation earlier, had easily
succumbed to the teachings of modern psychiatry. and
psychology in the matter of child-rearing. Sympathetic
understanding, and indeed, outright permissiveness, had
largely replaced discipline in the family situation, and
the military authorities found that even in time of all-
out war they had to contend with this aspect of American
culture.

> What the Army could or could not do in handling
> that segment of the nation's manpower that came
> under its direct control is illustrated by the
> fact that one of America's most skillful field
> commanders just missed being relieved of his
> post because in a moment of excitement he
> slapped a soldier. The Army was forced to shape
> its policies in terms of what the country
> would accept. [4]

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[4] Ibid., p. 15.

Thus we see the basis for the beginning of the change
that was to occur in the Army between 1940 and 1960. The
standing Army that was left with the return of millions
of World War II soldiers to civilian life was not the
"Old Army" of prior World War II days. What remained of
America's largest Army was, and is today, an Army of
uniformed civilians, holding in many respects more to the
values, customs and mores of American civilian life than
to traditional military standards.

It is useless to gainsay the impact of the larger
society on the military in this regard. While sociologists
and psychologists busied themselves studying the effect of
the military on discharged individuals and on the whole
American society and its standards and values, almost no
consideration was given to the radical change which had
been wrought in the military establishment itself. Only
with the breakdown of the American fighting man in Korea
some years later did it become apparent to some students
that a great change had come about in the military.

There is still little agreement at any level about the
American Army in Korea. We know that less than five years
after the cessation of hostilities in World War II, this
nation sent a force to Korea as part of a United Nations
operation. Again America called up a civilian Army for the
fighting. Although many of the men had been in uniform

during World War II, most had returned to civilian
occupations and could not be considered well-trained or
professional soldiers. The performance of this Army remains
a nightmare to many who are today charged with the training
and indoctrination of American youth in the military service.

We know that the urgency of the World War II
mobilization was totally lacking in June of 1950. We can
say that there was little understanding or sympathy on the
part of the total American populace to the reason or cause
for our involvement in the Korean Conflict. We can also
say that for the first time the American military was at
the mercy, not only of America's own politicians and
leaders, but of those of the other members of the United
Nations. Regardless of the numerous reasons and excuses
that can be, and have been, given, it still remains that
the American Army in Korea broke down in motivation, morale
and discipline to a degree unknown even in the most
hurriedly assembled and poorly equipped and trained segments
of our World War II Army.

Is it possible that the civilian-life concepts of
freedom of the individual, majority rule, democratic
process, privacy, non-conformity, and liberty, have been
forced too much upon the organized military establishment
in this country, to the extent that the controlling civilian
populace has been willing to risk impairing the effectiveness

of the nation's military by insisting upon an impossible "democratic army" devoid of that high degree of regimentation and disciplined organization which are the basic essentials of a fighting force? If it appears that this question is largely academic, it might well be remembered that American prestige in the Asian countries fell to a new low when it became apparent that a powerful, highly developed America lost the "Korean War" to a weak, underdeveloped Red China. One does not explain away defeat to the Oriental mind. America lost face. There is nothing worse in the Orient.

CHAPTER III

THE CIVILIAN ARMY

We have seen that the World War II and Korean Conflict American Armies were civilian armies, and we have discussed how large a segment of the civilian population was touched directly by military service. Let us now turn to a consideration of civilian attitudes toward the military.

Following the cessation of hostilities in 1945 and 1953, huge numbers of young men and women were returned to civilian life from military service. In fact, so large a percentage of American families came in contact with the military that it was inevitable that there should occur a dramatic change in the basic American attitude toward the military. Prior to the armed forces build-up under the Selective Service, very few Americans had any first hand experience with military service. The population was largely pacifist and anti-military. The standing army was too small to count as an important segment of American society.

Between the end of World War II and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, a whole generation of American young men returned to civilian occupations after military service, but they were never again to be rid of a continuing awareness of the military. In March 1946, in a speech at

Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill
coined the term "iron curtain;" soon after that the phrase
"cold war" was in use in almost every language in the world;
then came Korea.

By the time America had totaled her casualties and
brought home her sons from three years of war without logic
or logistics, there was no longer any question that the
United States would be one of the military powers of the
world. The outcome of what many thought would be a "six
weeks mop up of some crazy gooks" was frightening to those
who gave much thought to it. The majority of the American
people were simply as bewildered in 1953 as they had been
in the summer of 1950. At any rate, few sympathetic ears
were open to what opposition did develop to a continuing
peacetime draft and a soaring federal budget, half of which
was to go for defense expenditures.

Today the American people quite naturally accept the
idea of compulsory military service and high tax expenditures
for defense as necessary to survival. From a staunch anti-
militarism which preceded our entry into World War II,
through the righteous indignation and "win the war"
attitudes of the war years, through the frenzied haste of
demobilization and confusion of remobilization, our country
has come to an acceptance of the inevitability of international
tensions and cold war. Now each year thousands of young men

enter or leave the military service. For the most part
they never regard themselves as soldiers. They are
civilians forced by law into a life which they do not like
and for which they have no respect. Most regard their
period of service as a complete waste of that part of
their lives. There is no feeling of belonging, no pride in
association; to the contrary, there is more often an overt
disdain for the career man and a disrespect and resentment
of all military tradition and authority.

So it can be seen that the process that began with the
huge draft for World War II, which brought civilian values
and customs into conflict with military tradition and which
in part replaced the older tradition, has continued and
become an even more powerful force. Without the pressures
of actual war, the American people are less inclined to
tolerate what are regarded as military excesses in training
and discipline. There has been a complete change from the
pre-Pearl Harbor days, when a man's personnel file could be
annotated with a simple PI (meaning political influence) if
anyone in public office so much as inquired about him, to
the present condition which finds young men in uniform
corresponding directly with their representatives in the
Congress on all aspects of military life, and Many
Congressmen seem to regard the military as fair game in
vying for popularity with their constituents.

The very term "Congressional investigation" throws fear into the hearts of the bravest of the Army cadre. This is something to be avoided at almost all costs, and this feeling is one of the greatest impacts which the total society has had on the military. No longer is the military a thing apart; today the Army is not even a congregation of men, it is a procession of impatient, resentful, civilians.

To examine the newly inducted soldier as he reports for duty with the Armed Forces, I use facts, observations, and personal records from the Fifth United States Army Reception Station, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, during the period September 1959 to December 1960, when I served as the Reception Station Chaplain.

The three general groups arriving at the Reception Station were three year Regular Army inductees, two year draftees, and six-month active duty National Guard soldiers. The Reception Station received between fifteen hundred and two thousand men per week, with approximately one half the total number National Guardsmen. During the fifteen months of duty I kept records on approximately 1200 men, four hundred chosen from each group. The ages of the men ranged from seventeen to twenty five years.

College graduates were more numerous in the National Guard and draftee groups. The National Guard contained the largest number of men attending college who had interrupted their education and planned to return to school upon the

completion of their tour of duty. This group of National
Guardsmen contained the largest number of medical rejects
and emotionally and mentally disturbed individuals. The
number of medical board actions was high because many of
these men had not even been given an induction physical.
This group also contained the largest number of fraudulent
enlistments below the minimum age requirement. From the
town of Ada, Oklahoma alone, seven fifteen year old soldiers
arrived for training and before the completion of basic
training, all had been released from the service as unfit.

Certain traits were quite evident among the men from
the National Guard. This group did not integrate well with
the draftee or regular army soldiers, and kept together as
a group. Many had come as units from the same home town
and they immediately sensed an antagonistic feeling toward
them from the other inductees because of their shorter per-
iod of required active duty. The Guardsmen were referred
to as "week end warriors", "part time soldiers", and "draft
dodgers". This group of Guardsmen fell into two main cat-
egories. The first category was under age or emotionally,
mentally, educationally, or physically unfit for military
service; their ages ranged from seventeen to twenty. The
second category consisted of the twenty to twenty four year
old college students, college graduates, or skilled workers,
none of whom were potential career soldiers. Their attitude

was that the military was a necessary evil and they wished
to fulfill a legal obligation in the least painful way
possible, with the least amount of interruption to their
civilian plans. A very large number had fathers or older
brothers who had served in the military, yet there was very
little patriotism among this group. Though many were well
informed on foreign affairs and current events, they thought
World War II ancient history, and the Korean Conflict a bit
of national bungling that had wasted many lives in an unknown
cause. Approximately 75 per cent of this group had some con-
nection with the civilian church, and during basic training
the National Guard soldiers composed the largest group at
chapel attendance. It was also evident that civilian clergy
kept more active tabs and contact with this group during
their absence from the home parish.

The two year draftee fell largely into the 20 to 25
year age group which was largely composed of high school
graduates or men with some higher education or college
degrees. This group had the fewest number of physical,
emotional or mental problems and displayed little interest
in military careers. The men in this group displayed the
only apparent patriotism evident among the new inductees.
Many were proud that their fathers and relatives had served
during World War II and Korea. They looked on the military
establishment as an obligation which must be met for two

years and then forgotten. The draftee had a strong sense
of group relationship and togetherness with other draftees,
and adjusted to military life much easier than the other
inductees. This group also had the least number of personal
problems and approximately one half had allegiance to home
churches and parishes. Of all the inductees it can be
generalized that the two year draftee soldier had the most
wholesome attitudes toward the draft and accepted the sit-
uation as well as could be expected during peace time.

The three year Regular Army enlistee ranged in age from
seventeen to twenty five years and composed the lowest
educational group and the highest urban group. Many of the
three year inductees were from the larger cities of the Fifth
Army Area, and average education ranged from the 6th grade
through three years of high school. Many had difficulty in
finding employment and had enlisted in the Army. This group
also composed the largest career-potential soldiers, and
re-enlistment among this group was the highest of the three
categories. There was a lesser degree of group togetherness
or group relationships among the three year enlistees, and
very little physical or mental rejection due to prior physical
and mental examinations upon enlistment. A large number came
to the service with wild and fantastic tales of the big
salaries they had given up to enter the military and un-
believable promises made to them by Army Recruiters.

Patriotism was non-existent for the most part among the 3
year soldiers, and personal and psychological problems were
more evident in this group than in any other. The group as
a whole had little or no mental or psychological preparation
for the military and emotionally they had a difficult time
adjusting and adapting to military discipline. The largest
number of RA's seemed to be looking for three good meals a
day, a place to sleep, a chance for advancement without much
work, and an excellent means of escape from parents and homes.
This group also composed the largest number of men who had
little or no allegiance to anyone or any cause. It had the
largest number of men from broken homes, or a home that had
lost one or more family members in death or war. The RA
inductee in the Fifth Army Area had the smallest percentage
of church affiliation, approximately 20 per cent; and of the
20 percent, the largest number of church memberships came
from the smaller Protestant sects and fundamentalist groups.

From the foregoing, what conclusions in general can be
drawn, based on the impact of our changing society upon men
entering the Armed Forces today? At the outset it is clear
that since the patriotic feeling of World War II, the parents
have not inculcated much patriotic zeal to their children. The
peace time draft is taken for granted by the bulk of our
citizenry, and the majority of men arriving for military
service is desirous of getting the military obligation out
of the way as quickly as possible.

Today's inductee is better screened and examined than any previous inductee but does not appear to be enlightened on the military aspects of our national policy. Unemployment and chronic hardship industrial areas aid enlistments to a high degree, and society in general does not reflect, in the inductee, a military spirit of citizenship among the modern soldiers.

It can be concluded that the American people, as a whole, have accepted peace time military service as they accept high taxes, crowded highways, limited parking facilities, and bad weather with the typical shrug-shoulder acceptance of the inevitable; however, young American men, as individuals, show little acceptance or understanding of their roles in the military. This, then, is the foundation of the so-called "New Army" of which the oldtimers are so disdainful. The attitudes and consequent actions of the peace time civilian-soldier have had profound effect on the military, which now applies as much pressure on its personnel in authority to treat subordinates with kindness and dignity as it once applied on the ranks to observe traditional military courtesy. In addition, we can cite official encouragement of the soldier to air his complaints and use all channels of grievance presentation, and the revision of Courts Martial as further evidence of the emergence of the "Democratic Army."

CIVILIAN CONCEPTS IN THE MILITARY

Since we have earlier contended that the American
Military Establishment is no longer an "island" or a small
homogeneous group within the larger community because of
its size and the nature of its system of getting, keeping,
and releasing personnel, it is important to point out here
that the Army, at any given point in time, is still a
definable, identifiable sociological entity. As such it
can and does act upon the larger or non-military segment
of the total society, and is, in turn, acted upon by the
total and by other distinct sections of the total.

In this chapter we shall consider several concepts
which can be regarded as coming from the non-military
society and making an impact upon the military. These
concepts themselves have risen to their present potency
largely within the twenty year period under consideration.

I. INDIVIDUALISM: AUTHORITY AND SUBORDINATION

In the Laws, Plato says, "The wise shall lead and rule,
and the ignorant shall follow." Whether or not such a
condition, like much of Plato's dogma, is completely un-
attainable or even undesirable is not the question here. No
matter what virtue the idea may have, such was not the
situation in the military in World War II. Not only were

the enlisted ranks made up of inexperienced civilians, but
the officer corps was likewise composed of civilians with-
out prior interest in or knowledge of things military.

> At the onset of mobilization the Army had just
> under 14,000 regular officers on its rolls.
> During the next five and a half years it added
> 4,200 Regular Army officers; total officer access-
> ions were 877,200. Thus, 63 officers were mobilized
> from civilian life for every professional Army
> officer on active duty in mid-1940. Some of the
> officers from civilian life had had some degree
> of military experience, largely from their
> reserve training, approximately 150,000 or 17
> percent of the total. Most of the others, about
> 3 out of every 4 accessions, were commissioned
> directly from civilian life or were sent after
> a relatively short period of service as enlisted
> men to officer training and aviation schools
> from which they were commissioned.

> Although the Regular Army officers, assisted by
> National Guard and Reserve officers, carried most
> of the responsibility for the initial expansion up
> to December, 1941, after we entered the war,
> primary reliance, particularly in the lower grades,
> had to be placed on the recently transformed
> civilians 5

"The essential difference between an experienced officer
and a novice was in the extent to which they were able to
maintain the morale and effectiveness of their troops."[6]
What could possibly be more essential to a fighting army?
The tragic lack of trained commissioned and non-commissioned
officers was paid for with human lives.

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[5]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[6]Eli Ginzberg, The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. 3: Patterns
of Performance (New York: Columbia U Press, 1959), p. 150.

It may well be that the practitioners and students of political science and philosophy can replace the question of "Who should rule?" with the newer question of "How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?"[7] The military can only be expected, in time of war or in time of peace, to standardize a procedure which provides it with commanders and leaders; it can never so organize as to protect itself against that which is inherently military, namely, command. The standard which is used is mainly seniority.

> The Army, even more than industry, traditionally places heavy weight on seniority as a basis for promotion. Men are regularly advanced as long as they make no errors. In the precipitous expansion of 1942-43 the Army could not take time to assess carefully whether a man had positive qualities of leadership. While the expansion was sufficiently rapid to afford most good men a chance to move ahead regardless of their length of service, many were promoted largely because they had accumulated sufficient months in grade. [8]

An Army has to be built on a rather rigid system of authority and subordination if it is to succeed in its fighting mission. To the extent that this system is understood and operative, the army is effective in its

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[7] Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U Press, 1950), p. 120.

[8] Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 26.

manpower control and utilization; to the extent that it is misunderstood or breaks down, the army is ineffective in its manpower control and utilization. Since both officers and men came from non-military backgrounds to form the World War II Army, it was inevitable that both groups brought with them the civilian attitudes toward authority and regimentation. These attitudes were, and are today, largely in conflict or opposition to the military attitudes, but there simply were not enough military-oriented commissioned and non-commissioned officers to change the civilian attitudes of most of the young men called to duty. The only thing in the Army's favor during those hectic days was the pressure put on all segments of the American society after the shock of Pearl Harbor. Patriotic zeal rose to a high possible only in time of struggle, and the civilian soldiers accepted their civilian officers with less questioning of ability than is evident today.

Today the Army has lost the advantage that accrues to it during emergencies. Its short-time civilian soldiers feel none of the urgency which engulfed the country in the days of their fathers' military service. They bring with them from civilian life even more resentment of the authority-subordination roles necessary in the military, because, since 1940 and the incredible violence and anti-humanitarian chaos wrought by Hitlerian Germany, and the subsequent rise of world communism, the American young people have been

schooled and propagandized against collectivism, conformity, and authoritarianism. Regardless of the virtue of attempting to condition the people of this country against political concepts contrary to the American form of government, it is impossible for the military to function most efficiently if devoid of authoritarian regimentation.

This is the condition with which the military hierarchy is attempting to live today. Outside civilian and political pressures have been coupled with lack of training in the use of authority on the part of officers, and with strong resistance to what authority exists on the part of enlisted personnel. Added to this we find the almost enlisted-man attitude and resentment toward military service and tradition on the part of young two-year officers who have become such a big group in the peace time military establishment. They are for the most part no more a part of the traditional officer corps than are their enlisted contemporaries when we consider length of service and attitude. This group of civilian officers appears unable or unwilling to exercise military authority or discipline, and shows resentment of its subordination to the higher ranking professional officers.

Although the military is primarily concerned with the problems of authority and discipline, it is by no means the only area of contemporary American life which is witnessing a frightening breakdown in regard for authority. Our school

system, which so eagerly embraced liberal and permissive teachings in the name of progress, appears to be fighting now to reestablish the older teacher-pupil relationship and classroom discipline. It is obvious that until some progress is made in this direction in the American home and school, the end products of excessive permissiveness will result in the acceptance of the belief that the youth of America can not be expected to make very good soldiers.

In passing it is of interest to note the breakdown in the structure of the family unit of our society. When the family was a tight-knit productive group in former days, there existed a stable authoritarian relationship with the father at the head. Not only was he titular head of the family, but he was the leader, teacher and director of those activities by which the family maintained itself economically. With the increase in specialization and the decrease in the need for families to cling together as productive units, the position of the father has deteriorated greatly. Add to this the fashionable theories of making even the smallest children part of the "family council" and replacing all parental authority with child-imposed "family democracy" and it is easier to understand how incapable the American youth of eighteen or twenty years is to accept any authority or discipline, especially the rigid kind demanded in the military. "Some modern psychologists would say that the subordinate extends to the superior those attitudes he has

already learned to adopt toward his father in the small family."[9] When the father, the family and the school make no demands on the individual, it cannot be expected that the military establishment will have much success in making of him either a competent dispenser of authority or a willing subordinate. In our society, the military does not have the opportunity to inculcate the very young boy; our Army is thus a product of the current values and attitudes of the larger society.

II. BUSINESS: PERSONNEL AND MACHINES

America is a business-oriented society; therefore, it is not strange to note that business procedures, methods, attitudes and training have had a great impact upon the military in the last twenty years.

First we consider the people who make up the business world, how they have changed in the period under discussion, and how they have influenced the military establishment.

The age of the tycoon is part of our short history. American business barons operated with the same avarice and disregard for employee and general public that is characteristic of any unbridled power anywhere. In time the excesses

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[9]George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), p. 245.

of "big business" brought labor legislation and the rise of
organized labor unions with their own excesses at the expense
of the general public. Today's American is the product of
the gigantic leftward swing of the social and political
pendulum during the '30's and a continuance of New Dealism
during the '40's and '50's. This observation is not in the
nature of a critique of American political thought, but is
necessary to describe the change in business practices and
personnel training and attitudes since the days of the "big
operators." The all-powerful boss or owner at the one end
of the business scale, and the powerless, abused laborer at
the other, are things of the past.

Today men are college-trained for the business world
instead of simply being born into the controlling families
of industry. The bureaucracy of business has grown almost
as fast as the bureaucracy of government, and a giant
officer-worker or clerical or white collar business class
has emerged. Professor C. Wright Mills has devoted an
entire book to this subject.[10]

Organized unions have freed the laborer from fear of
employer authority. Contemporary American thought rejects
the concept of employer-rights. Big business has de-
centralized authority internally and gone into public

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[10]C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford U
Press, 1953).

ownership through stock sale externally until there is
rarely any family identification between top management
and the business itself. Everyone from the top down is an
"employee." These are the job attitudes to which the maj-
ority of our young people subscribe. Again we see the
breakdown of old authorities and allegiances.

In some respects the Army may be considered comparable
to a business. It is faced with problems of supply, trans-
portation, personnel management and many others; however,
the analogy soon ends in the realization that the military
is unique. The military has no product or service to sell
and no profit and loss column to dictate its operations.
Also, the military only makes the special demand on its men
that they kill and risk being killed as a matter of course.

With the acknowledged differences, there still are
enough similarities between the military and business to
permit some interesting comparisons. With the passing of
the business tycoons, American business has become less and
less an individually directed thing. Today we find not
only the traditional top management group, but also a much
larger, younger, school-trained middle management or junior
executive group. Staff studies, committee reports, joint
efforts, all are the order of the day. The once powerful
shop foreman is a thing of the past. Today he belongs to
neither the union-represented blue collar worker group, or

the technically trained white collar group.[11]

How similar is the condition in the military. The once powerful non-commissioned officer is as impotent an authority figure as the industry foreman in spite of periodic efforts to raise his prestige. The commanding officer is no longer the great power of the pre-World War II army. He is no longer the leader, decision-maker, dispenser of justice, court of last appeal that he once was. Today's professional or career military leader is schooled more in the procedure for preparing reports and completing forms than in military strategy, it would seem. He is buried under piles of administrative papers during much of his career. Any overt use of authority by him is viewed with suspicion by his superiors, and it is not uncommon to hear it said of a young officer that he will make a good officer someday when he learns to "deal with people." Where once the officer was rated on how well he dealt with disciplinary problems, today he is regarded as a failure if he has to resort to the traditional military court machinery established for the very purpose of enforcing discipline. He is expected to "mother" his men, not criticize them; guide them, not command them; counsel and assist them, not discipline them; and so forth until sometimes it appears

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[11]C. Wright Mills, op. cit., pp. 87-91.

that the young officer least likely to succeed in today's
Army is the one trained in the strict military tradition
which the Army insists it wants!

At all levels of command in the "New Army"," commanders
are more and more expected to be "organization men."
They are encouraged to act only on the basis of completed
staff studies and eschew one-man decisions. Everything
must be in writing to be official and to protect all
parties. Many officers graduate from the job of paper
pushing company commanders only to find themselves
committee-member desk soldiers. Surely all of the bureau-
cratic super-structure, paper mountains, and individual
flight from responsibility which has become commonplace in
industry has been introduced into the military.

It would seem that neither businessmen nor their
military counterparts any longer have the security of the
power position which those of their rank formerly enjoyed.
It apparently is no longer commendable in any segment of
our society for a man to seek authority, then use it. We
have become almost paranoid in our fear of authority and
power. In discussing the question of individual power,
David Riesman has made some interesting observations.

> Businessmen, moreover, are not the only people
> who fail to exploit the power position they are
> supposed, in the eyes of many observers to have.

Army officers are also astonishingly timid about exercising their leadership. During the war one would have thought that the army would be relatively impervious to criticism. But frequently the generals went to great lengths to refrain from doing something about which a congressman might make an unfriendly speech. They did so even at times when they might have brushed the congressman off like an angry fly. When dealing with businessmen or labor leaders, army officers were, as it seemed to me, astonishingly deferential; and this was as true of the West Pointers as of the reservists. Of course, there were exceptions, but in many of the situations where the armed services made concessions to propitiate some veto group, they rationalized the concessions in terms of morale or of postwar public relations needs or, frequently, simply were not aware of their power position. 12

No doubt America must protect herself from power groups from without and from within, and to do so she must maintain an alert, intelligent citizenry; but no nation can long endure in greatness by encouraging fear of responsibility to the point of inaction by those in authority. It would seem that the military must become increasingly conscious of the need to train officers in command functions rather than in business administration, and at the same time, while avoiding any type of irrational tyranny, to push for a return to an indoctrination of the ranks in the concepts of authority, responsibility, and subordination. The change must come from both sides. We need competent officers, and we need an environment in which they can

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12 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, Yale U Press, 1950), p. 251.

function to the end of training the young men for whom the
nation has decreed a period of military service.

Training in command competence would be an extremely
difficult feat without considerable revamping of the
requirements for commissioning young college men for short
military service. The very nature of a change which has
taken place in our educational picture makes a large
number of these young short-time officers particularly
adaptable to the business administration aspects of the
"New Army." Each year we are turning out of our colleges
more and more "business" graduates.

> In the last thirty years the number of men
> majoring in business has swelled almost in
> direct ratio: as those in the humanities majors
> have declined, and since 1940 the rate of
> increase has been growing steeper. Between
> 1940 and 1950 the number of business students
> doubled. By 1955, they had become the largest
> single undergraduate group- more than the
> majors in mathematics, all the natural sciences,
> all the physical sciences, all the biological
> sciences, and English, put together. 13

The increase in bureaucracy in government, business and
military organizations encourages young men into "business"
studies in college, and the graduation of so many "business-
oriented" young men encourages a continuation and increase
in the record-keeping, paper-pushing bureaucracy.

Even granting all the defects and deficiencies
customarily ascribed to the military, we cannot find fault

13William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 92-93.

with the military in those areas where the larger society simply compels military acceptance of non-military values without questioning the effect of these values on efficient military functioning. One of the great errors in present thinking seems to be that the Army can be and should be some sort of correctional institution which in six months, two or three years, as the case may be, can remake a twenty year old enlistee into something more acceptable to the society which molded him in the first place.

The second aspect of the changing American business scene is the reliance on machines. The so-called Industrial Revolution which history tells us occurred in England after 1760, had its counterpart in the United States somewhat later. This was a change in basic methods of production and manufacture from handmade to machine made. Today we are witnessing a continuation of what we shall here call the second phase of the Industrial Revolution. An over-simplification is to consider the changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as machine replacement of man's hands, and the present changes as machine replacement of man's brains.

The crash programs of the second World War required complete mobilization of people and machinery in the fastest possible time. Money was then no consideration. Anything which held the promise of speeding up any part of the war effort was underwritten by federal funds without question.

Research and development programs were pushed to the
fullest without regard to waste, and many things which are
today regarded as basic to our living standards and business
enterprises came off the drawing boards years before they
might have done so.

As government regulation increases in almost every
field of business endeavor, and as administrative laws
increase in geometric progression, paperwork and record-
keeping require an ever greater expenditure of personnel
and money in both the military establishment and civilian
industry. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that we
are in the midst of a great revolution in the manner of
processing all this paper.

Industry first buckled under the huge expense in terms
of money, time and personnel associated with post-war
administration. Money outlays for office machines and
increased salaries for the machine operators actually
resulted in enormous savings even to small businesses.
Rapidly the machines became more complex as requirements
grew and as competition in the field of office machines and
electronic brains increased. Today we stand on the
threshhold of an era of super-machines whose speed and
efficiency defy imagination.

The impact of these machines on the military has been
rather gradual because the military had personnel in
numbers   impossible to industry, and efficiency

and cost of operation were not great factors. Today the
military cannot afford the time even when personnel are
available for long-hand methods. The great preoccupation
with missle development brought home the fact that accuracy
and speed are too precious to risk bungling. Even the
program of personnel management has become too enormous
for the old methods, and the Army is more and more relying
on machine records for personnel and supply operations
throughout the world. As the Defense Department continues
to consume roughly half of the federal budget and a portion
of the lives of so many Americans, we can expect to find more
and more of its endless administration being given to
machines. It is unlikely that the military super-structure
will be able to reduce the numbers of people that the
machines replace as industry is doing, since governmental
agencies do not lend themselves readily to reduction, but
greater speed and accuracy can be expected in the handling
of records and information which previously required the
paper mountains, and, ideally, soldier personnel may
ultimately be released for tactical training.

III. RACIAL INTEGRATION

Racism is the greatest illness of American life: it is
the sin of her soul, the shame of her intellect, the virulent
poison of her system, and the cancer of her body! In no other
area is American society so schizophrenic as in racial matters.

Americans recoil at the superman theories of Nazi Germany, but see no analogy to their own attitudes toward Negroes, and to a lesser degree toward Jews and other groups. American soldiers fought and died to stop the atrocities of the Third Reich and its madman leaders, but they and their families saw no connection between the theories which permitted the existence of Buchenwald, Auschwitz, Dachau and other extermination camps and their own beliefs in the inherent inferiority of the Negro.

In 1946 Harper's Magazine published translations of six articles published originally in Izvestia by the Russian novelist, poet, short story writer and war correspondent, Ilya Ehrenburg, following his visit to the United States. The articles were subsequently reprinted as part of Outside Readings in Sociology, where they are introduced by the editors as follows:

> Our journalists give us as much information as they can gather about life in Russia. Here is some information about us given to the Russian people by Ilya Ehrenburg, recently characterized as "the foremost Soviet journalist." It is enlightening to see ourselves and our institutions through the eyes of someone from a different social milieu, especially from a social system so much at variance with ours that its proponents show positive hostility to much that we value. We may wince at the ridicule and resent the distortions .... But though the picture as a whole is out of focus, to the extent that some of these unpleasant statements have a basis in fact, we cannot do otherwise than acknowledge the criticisms as valid. 14

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[14]Edgar A. Schuler, Duane I. Gibson, Maude L. Fiero, and Wilbur B. Brookover, Outside Readings in Sociology (New York: Thomas Y Crowell Company, 1952), pp. 806-825.

As would be expected Mr. Ehrenburg takes us to task in almost every area of American life, but it is his comments on racism in the United States, written at the height of the demagoguery of Senator Bilbo, that are particularly scathing, especially since it would be hard to deny the unfortunate truth in much of what he wrote.

> It would seem that in this country of diverse races united by patriotism, national equality would prevail. However, America, which never knew feudalism, has established a racial hierarchy. The aristocracy are the English, Scotch, and Irish. After them come the Scandinavians and Germans, then the French and Slavs; much lower are the Italians, even lower still the Jews and Chinese; lower still the Puerto Ricans, and finally, at the bottom of the scale, the Negroes.

> In the war against Hitlerism America played a prominent part; yet racialism here has a legal standing. When I entered America I had to fill out a questionnaire which contained the question: "Race- White or Colored?" If a person has a "colored" great-grandfather he is designated as "colored" and is subject to various restrictions .... I met a lawyer in Nashville who spent a long time trying to persuade me that there are "inferior and superior races." He reiterated the theories of Rosenberg and other ideologists of the Third Reich. Then he showed me the portrait of his brother who was killed on the Rhine; he was proud of his brother, who had perished in the struggle against racialists. 15

> When I was in Mississippi I remembered how certain American journalists had been indignant when the Yugoslav National Front government had deprived about 200,000 people who had aided the Germans of the right to vote. These same American journalists consider it quite natural, however, that millions of American Negroes (among them soldiers who took part in the war for the freedom of America) are not allowed to vote. I would ask a question of my American readers: which is more fair- to take away the right to vote from people with black consciences or with black skins? 16

^{15}Ibid., p. 814. ^{16}Ibid., p. 816.

> Not a few Negroes have been in Europe; many fought
> for America against racialist Germany. They saw
> that in Paris or Rome no one looked at them as
> though they were plagued, and they returned home
> with even greater bitterness. The South is on
> the eve of a decisive event: either the owners
> will yield, or the Negroes- yesterday's men
> of the front line- will open the struggle for
> equality.
>
> I am convinced that in the end racialism will
> be overthrown in America; but it must be
> understood that this disease has penetrated
> deeply into the mind of the average American.
> I did not meet a single white in the South
> who was not contaminated with racialism. 17

It is not enough to protest that America has made great

strides since the immediate postwar days of Senator Bilbo-

she is still a long way from her alleged goal of equal

opportunity for all. Nor is it sufficient to say that

racism is on the decline in the United States as a result

of recent legislation- it is still a long way from being

dead.

Military people sometimes point with pride to the

progressiveness of the Army with its program of total

integration before legal pressures were brought to bear

against segregation in public schools and government contract

jobs; however, the military can hardly be considered as the

enlightened advocate of the Negro's course in America.

The World War II Armed Services were segregated by

color. "The military planners knew very little about the

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17 Ibid., pp. 819-820.

characteristics of the nation's human resources."[18] The
Army had no experience with modern war except for the
relatively short participation in World War I. "Some of the
experiences of World War I were so deeply engrained that
they led to serious defects in policy, such as the con-
viction about the limited value of Negro manpower."[19]
"Negro troops were overwhelmingly assigned to Service units
in World War II,[20] largely "to such Service units as the
Transportation Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and Corps of En-
gineers."[21] In the main the Armed Forces had separate
colored units and used colored persons only in menial
positions. The military racial policies simply reflected
the civilian value system, and the military authorities did
not conceive of their function as one of reform.[22] Here is
an excellent example of the military establishment failing
to exploit the power which it had in time of great national
stress. The Army, in particular, suffered from its own
policies in regard to the Negro at a time when it could have
done much to change those policies.

> Negroes born and educated in the North were assigned
> to segregated units, frequently under white Southern
> officers, located in training centers in the deep
> South. On duty and particularly off duty, they were
> exposed to the full brunt of discriminatory practices.[23]

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[18]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 12.   [19]Ibid., p. 13.

[20]Ibid., p. 181.   [21]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 112.

[22]E.T. Hall, Jr., "Race Prejudice and Negro-White Relations
in the Army," American Journal of Sociology, 52:401-409, (Mar.'47).

[23]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 7.

> There is no doubt that many Negroes born and
> educated in the North were very resentful
> when they were assigned for training in the
> deep South where segregation was most intense.
> As was pointed out in The Negro Potential,
> General Marshall at war's end held that the
> Army had been in error not to train Negroes
> in the North. It was not easy for the Negro
> to do his best for the Army when he had
> repeated evidence that Army policy was
> insensitive to, and tended to violate, his
> basic rights as a citizen. 24

It is a sobering thought for military men and civilians

alike to realize that these conditions occurred "during a

war fought by the United States in the name of democracy

against racialism and fascism of Hitler and Hirohito. When

these Negroes failed, it was in large measure a reflection

of the failure of American democracy."[25]

> While many Negroes saw military service as an
> opportunity to prove their individual worth
> and to help raise the prestige of their group,
> thereby striking a blow against segregation,
> many others failed to do their best. They
> could not free themselves from the crippling
> experiences which had been theirs from
> earliest childhood- "as a man is treated, so
> he is likely to respond." The Army in turn
> was greatly handicapped in making effective
> use of Negro manpower. Segregation interfered
> with the optimal training and assignment of
> Negroes of high potential; it led to a
> serious imbalance of skills and aptitudes
> in Negro divisions; and it was reflected in
> serious weaknesses in the leadership of Negro
> units. 26

There was discord between white officers and Negro

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[24]Eli Ginzberg, The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. 2:
Breakdown and Recovery (New York: Columbia U Press, 1959), p. 103.

[25]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 7.

[26]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 124-125.

enlisted men. "Morale among the Negro troops was low and
many resented being led by officers who seemed to hate
them as much as the enemy."[27] At a time when America was
rising to great heights of selfless patriotism and
astonishing the world with an unprecedented feat of
mobilization to fight for right and justice for all groups,
this nation fell woefully short of its basic obligations
to a large group of its own citizens.

What they can we say about the contributions which
this group of "second class citizens" made to the military
which regarded them so callously? Impartial postwar
studies from military records and from scores on the Army
General Classification Test show that there was a "markedly
higher ineffective rate among Negro soldiers— about twice
that of white soldiers .... ."[28] As would be expected,
there is the highly vocal group, both military and civilian,
which contends that this record simply accords with the
conclusive proof from World War I that Negroes could not
fight,[29] but for the student of social science these same
facts are of the utmost significance for refuting racist
theory, not reinforcing it. It has been shown that the
higher ineffective rate among Negro soldiers was due in

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[27]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol 2, p. 107.

[28]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

[29]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 89-90.

large part to their inferior educational background; however, this was not the exclusive reason for their lower effectiveness.

> Men who grow up in a segregated world which
> considers them inferior from the day of their
> birth cannot develop normally. Recognizing
> early that their opportunities are severely
> restricted, their ambition is likely to be
> stunted. Treated by many whites as only a
> grade or two above an African native, they
> see no point in attempting to live up to the
> standards of the white community. Staying out
> of trouble, even if one must feign "dumbness",
> appears to be more rewarding than seeking to
> win the respect and admiration of men who deny
> that you are, or ever can be, their equal. 30

Considerable evidence accumulated during World War II to prove that a major cause for the higher rates of ineffectiveness among Negro soldiers, "especially among the better educated, was their resentment and frustration at not being permitted to join a combat unit and at being treated according to the color of their skin rather than in terms of their ability."[31]

Fortunately we can find evidence of the existence of contrary thinkers in the hierarchy of the Armed Forces. It is not necessary to suggest that such people are motivated by a high sense of morals or ethics. It may be that they are simply cold-blooded realists trying to improve what is obviously a bad situation in spite of internal and external pressures for the maintenance of the status quo. At any

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[30]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 124.

[31]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 90.

rate there are records of military experiments with the
racial situation long before the official desegregation
policy came into being.

> For example, the Army tried out in Europe the
> radical idea of placing an entire platoon of
> Negro volunteers in a white infantry combat
> company. This was done in several divisions,
> most of which saw several months of subsequent
> battle. At the end of the campaign interviewers
> polled sample groups of men in several divisions
> to find out how the attitudes of men who had
> served with Negroes compared with those of men
> who had not. In divisions that had no mixed
> companies, 62 per cent of the soldiers said
> they would dislike very much to serve in the
> same companies as Negroes. Of white infantrymen
> who had fought in the same divisions but not
> the same companies as Negroes, only 20 per cent
> said they would dislike it very much. And among
> white infantrymen who had actually been in the
> same companies as Negroes, only 7 per cent
> said they disliked it very much.
>
> There was another very interesting finding.
> Two thirds of the white men in the mixed
> companies, when polled after the experience,
> said that they had been opposed to the scheme
> beforehand and had thought it would fail. This
> was almost exactly the same proportion of
> opponents as was found in divisions that had
> not experienced the plan; in other words, the
> retrospective answers about attitudes
> corresponded closely to those of groups
> reporting current attitudes, so one finding
> tended to confirm the other. 32

Such studies of attitudes are anathema to those vocal
racists in this country who continue to proclaim, regardless

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[32]Edgar A. Schuler, et. al., op. cit., p. 31. Reprint
of Samuel A. Stouffer, "A Study of Attitudes", Scientific
American, 180, N. 5 (May, 1949), 11-15.

of how often they are shown to be wrong, that soldiers, students, customers, or whatever other group is under consideration, will not tolerate racial integration. These are the people who predicted rioting and dire consequences when integration began on numerous college campuses several years ago. Even in those cases where student demonstrations did occur, it is probably safe to say that nowhere was the reaction as severe as the racists hoped it would be. The same was certainly true in the military. It is indeed unfortunate that the Army did not take advantage of its power position during the mobilization for World War II and push through a program of integration within the Army instead of adhering to outmoded, ineffective and inefficient theories about skin color and military service.

While we must not blame the military for inaction in areas which were not specifically military, it is quite possible that the great power which the Army could and did wield in forcing civilian communities where camps were located to conform to military standards of sanitation, venereal disease control, and numerous other areas, could have been brought to bear on those communities in regard to their treatment of Negro servicemen in commercial establish- ments. Instead, the Army closed its eyes to the inequality of both on-duty and off-duty discrimination against its Negro soldiers with the excuse that it could not reform

the civilian communities or change their customs, and that
military segregation was simply a necessary extension of
the civilian order.

In light of the above, it is ironic that the breakdown
in military segregation which began between World War II
and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea should have come
about from civilian pressures on the military. The military
establishment found itself the target of sanctimonious
criticism from the very civilian authorities which it
sought to please.

At any rate, better late than never, and a breakdown
did occur in the segregation pattern following World War
II, albeit slowly. The Air Force, as the newest of the
military services and the one least encrusted with
tradition, made the most rapid progress toward treating
Negroes as individuals and assigning them according to
ability. The Army moved somewhat slower to eliminate
segregated recreational facilities, units, training programs
and difficulties in promoting Negroes. The most conservative
service, the Navy, has been the most reluctant to change its
tradition of using Negroes only in menial capacities.[33]

With the outbreak of armed conflict again in 1950, the

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[33]Francis E. Merrill and H. Wentworth Eldredge, Culture
and Society (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 261.

desegregation process in the Army was speeded up with the assignment of Negroes to integrated combat units. Reports from field commanders in Korea lend weight to the argument that environmental considerations may affect the range of performance of the individual.

> .... after Negroes were integrated into combat units, most of them made a special effort to do well for they realized that they were being watched by all--white and Negro alike. Those who were prejudiced against them were sure that they would not stand up in combat. And their friends were anxiously awaiting proof that they would do as well as the next man, if not better. It soon became clear that the performance of Negro troops improved markedly when the Army began to treat them without regard to their color. 34

"The idea of 'race' represents one of the most dangerous myths of our time, and one of the most tragic."[35] It is rare indeed to find a person who does not knowingly or unknowingly subscribe to some false notion about race. In this day of preoccupation with things "scientific," we find evidence of people turning to totally unsubstantiated theories and writings of politically-directed racists in an effort to quote "facts" about races which reinforce their own culturally-based biases. America can ill afford to lend any aura of respectability to any racist notion or action on the part of her military, her citizens or

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[34]Eli Ginzberg, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 288.

[35]M. F. Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, 3d Ed., (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 1.

municipalities when she is committed to the championing
of equality and justice throughout the world.

We are presently witnessing a tremendous upheaval in
race relations in our country. Our prominence in world
affairs and improvement in world communications have
resulted in speeding up of the process of social change.
Change in tradition and mores is customarily slow and
painful; it is destined to be more painful when the
process is speeded up by the active enforcement of de-
segregation legislation. The military has a definite
advantage over the civilian community in the very nature of
its structure. It is not as subject to the various pres-
sures which arise to disrupt amicable relations between
different ethnic groups. Within the military there is
nothing really comparable to the problems which arise and
take on racial significance in times of job scarcity or
economic slowdown; social relations between the sexes;
housing and urban renewal; and educational opportunity.

The military establishment bowed first to civilian
segregation pressures, then to civilian and political
desegregation pressures. It is now in the forefront of
showing the civilian community true integration and of
having a chance to make its own impact upon the larger
community. Certainly the degree of sanitation in the local
civilian restrants and the quantity of venereal disease in

the local civilian brothels should be of no greater concern
to military authorities than the equitable treatment of all
American soldiers in the nearby commercial establishments
where they spend a large part of their military pay. The
great concern evidenced by most communities at the very
suggestion that a nearby Army camp is about to be closed
should be a guide to military authorities that the civilian
communities are susceptible to reasonable pressures from
the military.

IV. POLITICAL

In concluding this chapter on civilian concepts in the
military, it is interesting to note briefly the impact which
political pressures are making on the military. Since World
War II more and more of our elected officials have had
personal military experience. They are, therefore, more
aware of and sympathetic to the military experiences of
their constituents. Today our people feel much closer to
their elected representatives in terms of distance and time,
and they are keeping full the mailbags of their congressmen.
The young civilian serving his time in the military and his
family do not hesitate to apprise their representatives in
Washington of things wrong with the Armed Forces; and
congressmen do not hesitate to require immediate clarification
or explanation from military authorities.

For some time now the military has been in the public limelight. The testimony of its officers before Congress is given wide coverage in the press and on radio and television. The expenditures (and alleged waste) of the Department of Defense are a matter of daily public conversation. Missle shots and submarine sailings are daily news. The American people are looking to the Armed Forces to maintain their "place in the sun."

It seems inevitable that the highest ranking generals must today be politicians and liaison men with politicians as well as military men, but it is important that the military resist to the fullest what appears to be the tendency to require that young company commanders give political consideration to their every move in training a company of young short-time soldiers. In our democracy the ultimate use and deployment of military forces must remain in the hands of the civilian authorities; but the training of men for military service is the function of the military and cannot degenerate into a politician's garden party if we are to establish and maintain an active army and a well-trained ready reserve.

The Cold War is a fact with which we have been living for some time. Compulsory peace time military service is a corollary fact. What is ethically and morally objectionable in the military establishment should be ferreted out

and discontinued, but the larger society defeats itself if it insists that through its political machinery it will impose all its values and conditions upon the Armed Forces. The single raison d'etre of an army is war. If we can postpone or avoid war by maintaining a large, strong fighting force, then we are the gainers; but the army that we maintain must be a real army, not just a roster of men, if we hope to appear strong. Political pressure or investigation in regard to every mother's complaint of her son's dislike of lack of privacy in barracks, ill-fit in the uniform or poor seasoning of the messhall food must not become a Washington fetish.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY INTEGRATION INTO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

There was a time before and during World War II that
the soldier (officer or enlisted man) was a segregated
person. He lived on a military reservation, in some type
of Army-provided quarters. He had little contact with the
civilian population, and in some areas of the country
found himself regarded with suspicion and hostility by
civilians.

Today we are witnessing a radical change in the dis-
persion of military personnel within this country.
Granting that the large majority of troops continue to be
on military bases, there are more and more instances of at
least commissioned and non-commissioned officers living
and working in civilian communities. For example, many
of our colleges and universities have officer and NCO
personnel on their faculty staffs, and these people live
in the civilian communities quite apart from any large
military post. Likewise, there has been a change in
continental defense preparation since the advent of the
guided missle. Our major cities are being ringed with small
missle sites, manned by relatively few personnel who live in
the civilian communities and commute between sites. Per-
sonnel assigned to various headquarters and small arsenals

and installations live in civilian communities in such
small numbers that they are not regarded any differently
than their civilian counterparts. Add to this the National
Guard organization and its cadre and the recruiting
offices in every city, village and hamlet throughout the
nation, and we begin to recognize the scope of the complete
military integration into the civilian community.

There has always been the condition of off-post
personnel living in communities surrounding large military
bases, but today at least a small group of military
personnel are living a real civilian existence in all
respects except the eight hour day.

It becomes more and more evident that when members of
a group are present in the larger community in numbers so
small and without concentration they tend to lose their
group identification in the eyes of the receiving community,
and become an integrated part of it. The military man then
tends to lose his traditional self-consciousness around
civilians, and the civilian population forgets that this
individual belongs to a "suspect transient element."

The results have provided this nation not only with
a civilian-soldier but an integrated civilian-military
community as well.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing we can draw several, at least tentative, conclusions. Both the total American society, and its relatively small military segment have been and are in a period of rapid change. The values and pressures of the larger community are being felt acutely by the military as peace time compulsory military service becomes an inescapable and accepted part of our way of life. These values and pressures are, in large measure, the antithesis of traditional military customs, and their impact on the military establishment is causing considerable difficulty in the execution of the peace time mission, viz., training of non-military and anti-military young men for war.

The lack of respect for authority and fear of responsibility which is becoming increasingly evident at all levels of the military structure are an outgrowth of these same conditions in the total society. These attitudes are predominant in our culture today, and are the attitudes to which the young men are subjected for all their years prior to military service. The position of the military in American life is still not strong enough to permit a radical departure from civilian values during military training,

and so the Army must work within the newer value system
which has been imposed upon it or find itself subject to
severe political censure.

The rise of Welfare State concepts in our country,
with their inherent birth to grave paternalistic security,
has a direct influence on the thinking of the young people.
There is a notable lack of patriotic zeal even with an
acknowledgement of the Cold War and the threat of internat-
ional communism, but this lack is simply an extension of the
civilian equivalent which assumes the form or lack of
identification with or loyalty to any of the traditional
civilian institutions, including the family. (One can muse
on the paradox that the breakdown and disparagment of
"rugged individualism" seems to have produced a nationwide
individual self-centeredness!)

It appears unlikely that the Cold War will soon end.
The only possibility for a break in the Cold War seems to
be entrance into Hot War; therefore we, as a nation, are
committed to a strong defense posture and an equally strong
military structure for fighting any place in the world as
part of an allied or United Nations force. We are bound to
numerous pacts which require us to give military protection
as well as economic aid. Toward this end, we continue the
draft and training of young men, but our involvement in

Korea showed how ineffective our military organization can be under the very conditions we can expect to find in other brushfires which spring up during the Cold War.

Our people, civilian and military, simply do not identify with the peoples or causes which we are committed to defend. We are presently on the brink of military involvement in Laos, the Congo and Vietnam, not to mention the potential explosiveness of Berlin. We cannot afford another "defeat" of the Korean kind without losing all appeal to the African and Asian nations who are closely watching the power struggle with an exhibited eagerness to be always on the winning side.

Careful scrutiny of the releases of the various news media in recent weeks reveals that there is a strong move to overcome American inertia resulting from lack of identification with the people and cause of the remote areas currently in chaos by a hammering home of the theme that we are under attack by the Russian Bear. Public apathy must give way to great indignation against the Russians or the Red Chinese if we are to intervene successfully in areas where Americans care little about, and understand even less, current wars and political machinations. A people fight best when they are defending their own; they are at their worst when they find no cause and no

purpose. Most wars are fought somewhere between those two extremes, but it is important that the general population be sufficiently prepared regarding cause and purpose if we are to ask a drafted Army to fight effectively far from its own shores. Young men can be given training and equipment; MOTIVATION is a much more subtle thing.

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